The article is a review of theoretical discussions about children’s agency in the new sociology of childhood, on the one hand, and a review of empirical studies of children’s political agency, on the other. These two fields often discuss the same problem, but look at it from different perspectives. Childhood theorists debate what children’s agency is and whether the search for it should be critical. Some of them continue to postulate the need to consider children as social actors, while others criticize this position for its ahistorical nature, normative charge, and simplified understanding of agency and subjectivity. Empirical researchers of children’s political participation are not too concerned with the conceptualization of the very concept of agency, but the materials of their research allow us to understand how children themselves in different situations discursively construct their agency — as more progressive than that of an adult; as no different from an adult; as interconnected with an adult; or even as inferior to an adult. Children do not deprive themselves of agency out of nowhere; such deprivation can be explained by both class factors and factors associated with the characteristics of socialization. Thus, studies of children’s political participation strengthen the grounds for criticizing the “naive” attitude to seek children’s political agency a priori, but at the same time they call into question the possibility of one, “correct” definition of children’s (political) agency. The review of discussions and findings in both areas ends with a formulation of problems and questions that childhood researchers, including Russian ones, have yet to resolve.

The article discusses the problem of the naturalistic methodology of social ontology. Following Katherine Hawley's (2018) analysis, the author considers three approaches: conceptual analysis, the ameliorative (or normative) approach, and inference to the best explanation (from best social science to social ontology). Hawley concludes that only the first two can provide a viable naturalistic social metaphysics, and the latter cannot. The author, drawing on the notion of naturalistic limitations of social ontology, shows that only a conclusion to the best explanation can lead to a consistent realistic social ontology; this methodology avoids the problem of being rooted in concepts that do not have an empirical basis, which contradicts realism, and also does not imply normative prescription, which also contradicts the realistic description of the world. The problem critics attribute to inference to the best explanation — the lack of a predictively strong theoretical core of social theory from which to infer social ontology — can be resolved by satisfying three criteria (Turner, 2007): physical realizability, computability, and cognitive realism. The author proposes to implement them through the introduction of naturalistic restrictions into game theory. Formal models of coordination described by a correlated equilibrium — coupled with evolutionary explanations of the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the causal processes that make formally described coordination possible — may provide the desired theoretical core from which ontology can be derived.

The article analyzes some possibilities of defining the "best interests of the child" as a concept and principle that arose in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The "interests of the child" do not have a clear definition and become open to different interpretations. Ideas about right actions towards the "interests of the child" can vary on the level of practices, depending on the actor or group of actors. The article examines the emergence of the concept of "the interests of the child" as one of the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and notes the difference between the "opinion" of the child and their "interests", which relate to the implementation of children's rights. The article provides a brief overview of critical works on the concept of "child interests" — and discusses findings from the field of social sciences — that help contextualize “childhood” and ideas about "children's interests" through a social and cultural framework. The author suggests conceptualizing of the "interests of the child" as a rationalized myth in the terms of J. Meyer and B. Rowan.

The focus of the article is the project of British sociologists H. Collins and R. Evans on the Study of Expertise and Experience (SEE). The author of this article attempts to explicate the contexts of talking about expertise as a socio-political phenomenon. On the one hand, expertise is discussed in one line of research as an important component of socio-political processes. Expertise is defined in terms of power, its ability to influence decision-making processes in a legitimising way is increasing. On the other hand, the socio-ontological status of expertise is leveled due to the democratisation of access to information and the divergence of the modes of со-existence of science and politics, which is why, according to the researchers, expertise is in crisis. In these contexts, the author turns to the SEE project, which seeks to address the side effects of the proliferation of constructivist sociologies of knowledge and science. By questioning the ability of groups to access the truth and formulate expert judgements on its behalf, constructivist sociology removed the expert as a bearer of specified knowledge from the intellectual scene. Collins and Evans put expertise back on the research agenda; they propose a normative typology of expertise. The author of the article reconstructs the logic of constructing classifications of expertise and problematising two of its key types — interactional and contributory expertise. The article describes in detail the philosophical assumptions behind the concept of interactional expertise. The claims of this concept — as the author of the project sees it — to describe not only a common type of expertise, but also to become one of the conceptual resources for describing society are questionable, due to linguistic reductionism. Collins and Evans reproduce classic problems of sociological theory within the primary distinction of types of expertise.

The article presents an analysis of the main aspects of the Christian theology of childhood based on the works of outstanding theologians of the 20th century: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Karl Rahner, Paul Tillich, and Jurgen Moltmann. The preoccupation with understanding the figure of the child in Western Christianity is motivated by several factors: the undeniable importance of theology as a tradition of interpreting the existential constraints of the human condition, the deep influence of Christian teaching on secular concepts of childhood, as well as the need to stand in defense of theological knowledge against its reactionary appropriation. It is proposed to begin reflection on the problems of the theology of childhood with the question of secularization, which Bonhoeffer characterized as the world's coming of age. The symptoms of such maturation are a crisis of responsibility in an atomized society, powerlessness, and despair from being doomed to remain in a self-closed system moving towards its own destruction. In the eyes of theologians, the figure of the child turns out to be a symbol of the incompleteness of the history of the world and, in the context of Christian eschatology, of the possibility of saving humanity. For a world that has lost its historical dimension, the child comes across, in Moltmann’s words, as a metaphor of hope. Theology emphasizes the intrinsic value and uniqueness of every individual childhood experience, while at the same time seeing it as an analogy of the universal relationship between the human community and God. The model of this relationship implies not only acceptance of the world and its law, but also reprehension leading to liberation from the law in divine love. In theological interpretations the Christian imperative to be like children appears as the cornerstone of universal ethics and political practice, which is necessary for humanity to overcome the catastrophic historical situation.

The article is devoted to an anthropological study of psychotherapeutic discourse adaptation by religious specialists within the Catholic practice of spiritual exercises. Grounded in the therapeutic culture's notion that an individual's roots lie deeply within their family history and childhood experiences, this article examines how issues related to family relationships may surface during the development of psychotherapeutic techniques by religious groups. It also investigates the childhood images upon which these "syncretic" projects might be based. Considering the Catholic practice of spiritual exercise allows us to explore the historical roots of the “personal relationship with God”. This concept appears in various spiritual movements from the late Middle Ages and early Modern period, which emphasized emotional religiosity, meditation, and imaginative practices. In the present context, the interpretation of the relationship with God and other agents of divine nature in psychotherapeutic terms is based on a combination of traditional Jesuit spiritual direction practices with ideas from psychodynamic theories found in American spiritual direction manuals of the 1970s-1990s. From this angle, the image of God is interpreted as a projection of an authoritative adult image internalized in childhood, and problems in the “relationship with God” are seen as a consequence of unresolved issues with significant others. Using one of the most important therapeutic tropes of the “inner child” as the basis for meditation practice, spiritual directors invite participants to envision a scene where a child version of their personality receives unconditional love. However, unlike the therapeutic version of the practice of “inner child work,” in the Catholic paradigm, the individual should neither become the agent of their own healing nor reparent themselves. The logic of personal responsibility and “parenthood” as its metaphor is replaced by the logic of humility and surrendering oneself to the divine will, i.e., true childhood. The article high-lights the need to closely examine imaginative techniques in religious cultures and psychotherapeutic contexts, and questions the commonality in their epistemological stance on the nature and function of imagination.