Что смешение моделей агентности в социальной онтологии Франческо Гуала говорит об эволюции нормативности социальных институтов

В статье критически анализируется унифицированная социальная онтология Франческо Гуалы, а именно теория «правил-в-равновесии» (RiE), разработанная совместно с Фрэнком Хиндриксом. RiE пытается примирить объяснения социальных институтов на основе правил и равновесий, утверждая, что конститутивные правила Джона Сёрла — лишь лингвистические трансформации регулятивных правил, образующих коррелированные равновесия в координационных играх. Несмотря на новаторский подход, теория содержит фундаментальные проблемы, подрывающие её объяснительную адекватность. Во-первых, выявляется конфляция моделей агентности в RiE. Гуала отождествляет паттерны решения стратегических проблем у животных (как эволюционно стабильные стратегии) с коррелированными равновесиями в решениях людей, несмотря на их расходящиеся допущения: первые являются онтическими, вторые — эпистемическими и байесовскими. Эта конфляция проистекает из неверного применения концепции «буржуа-равновесия» Джона Мэйнарда Смита, описывающего эволюционную стабильность, а не коррелированные стратегии. Во-вторых, обнаруживается критическая двусмысленность понятия «репрезентация» в RiE. Хотя Гуала обосновывает уникальность людей через когнитивную способность к расцеплению стимула и реакции, теория не объясняет механистически, как эта способность порождает нормативные правила из структур равновесий. Репрезентация функционирует одновременно как отношение между концептами и вещами и как когнитивная способность живых организмов, но их связь остается неразработанной. В итоге нормативность вводится в RiE без адекватного объяснения. Статья предлагает переход от репрезентационной к онтической объяснительной модели, опираясь на теорию конструирования ниши для объяснения того, как способности к расцеплению стимула и реакции позволяют нормативным социальным институтам возникать из «животных конвенций».

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