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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">socofpower</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Социология власти</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Sociology of Power</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2074-0492</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2413-144X</issn><publisher><publisher-name>The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">UXJNAO</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">socofpower-430</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СТАТЬИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ARTICLES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Что смешение моделей агентности в социальной онтологии Франческо Гуала говорит об эволюции нормативности социальных институтов</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Conflation of agency models in Francesco Guala’s social ontology sheds light on how normativity of social institutions might have evolved</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5040-8897</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Шевченко</surname><given-names>В.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Shevchenko</surname><given-names>V.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Шевченко Валерий— аспирант </p><p>Москва</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Valerii Shevchenko — PhD student</p><p>Moscow</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">valerii.s.shevchenko@gmail.com</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>HSE University</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2026</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>27</day><month>06</month><year>2026</year></pub-date><volume>38</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>187</fpage><lpage>229</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Шевченко В., 2026</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2026</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Шевченко В.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Shevchenko V.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://socofpower.ranepa.ru/jour/article/view/430">https://socofpower.ranepa.ru/jour/article/view/430</self-uri><abstract><p>В статье критически анализируется унифицированная социальная онтология Франческо Гуалы, а именно теория «правил-в-равновесии» (RiE), разработанная совместно с Фрэнком Хиндриксом. RiE пытается примирить объяснения социальных институтов на основе правил и равновесий, утверждая, что конститутивные правила Джона Сёрла — лишь лингвистические трансформации регулятивных правил, образующих коррелированные равновесия в координационных играх. Несмотря на новаторский подход, теория содержит фундаментальные проблемы, подрывающие её объяснительную адекватность. Во-первых, выявляется конфляция моделей агентности в RiE. Гуала отождествляет паттерны решения стратегических проблем у животных (как эволюционно стабильные стратегии) с коррелированными равновесиями в решениях людей, несмотря на их расходящиеся допущения: первые являются онтическими, вторые — эпистемическими и байесовскими. Эта конфляция проистекает из неверного применения концепции «буржуа-равновесия» Джона Мэйнарда Смита, описывающего эволюционную стабильность, а не коррелированные стратегии. Во-вторых, обнаруживается критическая двусмысленность понятия «репрезентация» в RiE. Хотя Гуала обосновывает уникальность людей через когнитивную способность к расцеплению стимула и реакции, теория не объясняет механистически, как эта способность порождает нормативные правила из структур равновесий. Репрезентация функционирует одновременно как отношение между концептами и вещами и как когнитивная способность живых организмов, но их связь остается неразработанной. В итоге нормативность вводится в RiE без адекватного объяснения. Статья предлагает переход от репрезентационной к онтической объяснительной модели, опираясь на теорию конструирования ниши для объяснения того, как способности к расцеплению стимула и реакции позволяют нормативным социальным институтам возникать из «животных конвенций».</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>According to Hannah Arendt, a hallmark of the modern era is the alienation of the individual from the world, understood, in part, as a loss of interest in the common things that mediate political process. Оne of the origins of modern alienation for Arendt was the discovery of the New World and the ensuing explosion of cartography. This article attempts to demonstrate the political potential of maps as a means of “re-engaging with the world”. Following Bonnie Honig, one could argue that the pre-modern tradition of participatory cartography has such potential. The reconnection proposed by this tradition could lie in the transformation of the world reflected on the participatory map into a thing that can serve as a subject of discussion and a basis for the selfidentification of the collective. As a positive illustration of the work of participatory cartography today, the article turns to the late work of Bruno Latour. Seeing modern cartography as a means of reproducing the erroneous notion of the Earth as a closed totality of the Globe, Latour proposes as an alternative other principles of cartography appropriate to the age of the new climatic regime. Some of these principles, in particular the identification of intangible and not always visible agents of territory on cartographic projections, formed the basis of his last experiment ‘Où Atterrir?’. In it, the final maps of territories produced by the research participants become a means of making the public's concerns visible, ensuring the sustainability and accessibility of the political space.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>социальная онтология</kwd><kwd>правила-в-равновесии</kwd><kwd>коррелированное равновесие</kwd><kwd>конститутивные правила</kwd><kwd>социальные институты</kwd><kwd>нормативность</kwd><kwd>теория игр</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>social ontology</kwd><kwd>rules-in-equilibria</kwd><kwd>correlated equilibrium</kwd><kwd>constitutive rules</kwd><kwd>social institutions</kwd><kwd>normativity</kwd><kwd>game theory</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Aoki M. (2007) Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes. 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