Death Stranding, Hobbes and the Problem of Social Order: Where (and How) Should we Haul the Sover- eign?

In this article I describe the implicit conceptualization of social order which exists in Death Stranding - localized in both the setting and the mechanics of the game - and compare it with the conceptualization of Thomas Hobbes's "Leviathan". First, the theoretical tension between Death Stranding and "Leviathan” is traced: the speculative conceptualization of the Leviathan and the procedural conceptualization of Death Stranding are compared by clarifying the role that the concepts of action, authorization, right and sovereignty play in Hobbesian theory and the video game. Secondly, the theoretical tension between the political and natural capacities of the Sovereign according to Hobbes is explicated; with the help of material from Death Stranding, a variant of its resolution is proposed, suggesting the conceptualization of the Sovereign-without-a-body: an instance devoid of physical capacity and materiality, yet still capable of maintaining social order as a product of its activity. Subsequently, attention is paid to the mechanics of state expansion in Death Stranding: I describe and analyze how the Sovereign-without-a-body's messenger - the protagonist of the video game - interacts with people outside the Sovereign's zone of influence, convincing them to consent to return to the commonwealth. This theoretical move makes it possible to supplement Hobbes's binary scheme of the state of nature and commonwealth with a third concept - the state of memory, in which the memory of the Sovereign turns out to be a decisive factor influencing whether the commonwealth will be restored to its former boundaries. By explicating the Hobbesian theory of imagination, I demonstrate that - in the state of memory - the Sovereign is contingent, not fully defined, and virtual.

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