“Inference to the Best Explanation” as a Methodology of Social Ontology

The article discusses the problem of the naturalistic methodology of social ontology. Following Katherine Hawley's (2018) analysis, the author considers three approaches: conceptual analysis, the ameliorative (or normative) approach, and inference to the best explanation (from best social science to social ontology). Hawley concludes that only the first two can provide a viable naturalistic social metaphysics, and the latter cannot. The author, drawing on the notion of naturalistic limitations of social ontology, shows that only a conclusion to the best explanation can lead to a consistent realistic social ontology; this methodology avoids the problem of being rooted in concepts that do not have an empirical basis, which contradicts realism, and also does not imply normative prescription, which also contradicts the realistic description of the world. The problem critics attribute to inference to the best explanation — the lack of a predictively strong theoretical core of social theory from which to infer social ontology — can be resolved by satisfying three criteria (Turner, 2007): physical realizability, computability, and cognitive realism. The author proposes to implement them through the introduction of naturalistic restrictions into game theory. Formal models of coordination described by a correlated equilibrium — coupled with evolutionary explanations of the cognitive mechanisms responsible for the causal processes that make formally described coordination possible — may provide the desired theoretical core from which ontology can be derived.

1. Bechtel W. (2009) Looking down, around, and up: Mechanisticexplanation in psychology. Philosophical Psychology, 22(5): 543–564. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080903238948

2. Bicchieri C. (2005) The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511616037

3. Bloch M. (2012) Anthropology and the Cognitive Challenge, Cambridge University Press. https://books.google.com?id=bjfUmDSk2KcC

4. Boyd R. (1991) Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 61(1/2): 127–148. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320174

5. Boyd R. (2021) Rethinking natural kinds, reference and truth: Towards more correspondence with reality, not less. Synthese, 198(12): 2863–2903. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02138-4

6. Boyd R. N. (1983) On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism. In C. G. Hempel, H. Putnam & W. K. Essler (Eds.) Methodology, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science: Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Stegmüller on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, June 3rd, 1983 (pp. 45–90). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7676-5_3

7. Bunge M. (1993) Realism and antirealism in social science. Theory and Decision, 35(3): 207–235. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01075199

8. Chakravartty A. (2007) A metaphysics for scientific realism: Knowing the unobservable (1. publ), Cambridge University Press.

9. Craver C. F. & Darden L. (2013) In Search of Mechanisms: Discoveries across the Life Sciences, University of Chicago Press. https://books.google.com?id=ESI3AAAAQBAJ

10. Elder-Vass D. (2007) A Method for Social Ontology: Iterating Ontology and Social Research. Journal of Critical Realism, 6(2): 226–249. https://doi.org/10.1558/jocr.v6i2.226

11. Epstein B. (2015) The ant trap: Rebuilding the foundations of the social sciences, Oxford University Press.

12. Fararo T. J. (1989) The meaning of general theoretical sociology: Tradition and formalization, Cambridge University Press.

13. Gallotti M. (2012) A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 42(1): 3–30. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393111426864

14. Gilbert M. (1992) On Social Facts. Princeton University Press. https://books.google.com?id=yYvcDwAAQBAJ

15. Gintis H. (2007) A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(1): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X07000581

16. Gintis H. (2009) The bounds of reason: Game theory and the unification of the behavioral sciences, Princeton University Press.

17. Gintis H. & Helbing D. (2013) Homo Socialis: An Analytical Core for Sociological Theory. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2362262

18. Glennan S. (2017) The New Mechanical Philosophy (Vol. 1), Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779711.001.0001

19. Guala F. (2006) Has Game Theory Been Refuted? The Journal of Philosophy, 103(5): 239–263. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20619937

20. Guala F. (2007) The Philosophy of Social Science: Metaphysical and Empirical. Philosophy Compass, 2(6): 954–980. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00095.x

21. Guala F. (2016) Understanding institutions: The science and philosophy of living together, Princeton University Press.

22. Hacking I. (1999) The Social Construction of What? Harvard University Press. https://books.google.com?id=XkCR1p2YMRwC

23. Hammerstein P. & Stevens J. R. (Eds.). (2012) Evolution and the mechanisms of decision making: Forum, which was held in Frankfurt am Main, from June 19‒24, 2011, MIT Press.

24. Harms W. F. (2004) Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes, Cambridge University Press. https://books.google.com?id=ztl99e9ugtAC

25. Haslanger S. A. (2012) Resisting reality: Social construction and social critique, Oxford University Press.

26. Hawley K. (2018) Social Science as a Guide to Social Metaphysics? Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 49(2): 187–198. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-017-9389-5

27. Ignatow G. (2014) Ontology and Method in Cognitive Sociology. Sociological Forum, 29(4): 990–994. https://doi.org/10.1111/socf.12131

28. Kaidesoja T. (2013) Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology (0th ed.), Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203753484

29. Kaidesoja T., Sarkia M. & Hyyryläinen M. (2019) Arguments for the cognitive social sciences. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 49(4): 480–498. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12226

30. Kincaid H. (2008) Structural Realism and the Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science, 75(5): 720–731. https://doi.org/10.1086/594517

31. Ladyman J., Ross D., Spurrett D. & Collier J. (2007) Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, OUP Oxford. https://books.google.com?id=khBREAAAQBAJ

32. Lauer R. (2019) Is Social Ontology Prior to Social Scientific Methodology? Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 49(3): 171–189. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393119840328

33. Law J. (2004) After Method: Mess in Social Science Research, Psychology Press. https://books.google.com?id=E20X7N0nBfQC

34. Little D. (2020) Social Ontology De-Dramatized. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 51(1): 13–23. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393120916145

35. Lohse S. (2017) Pragmatism, Ontology, and Philosophy of the Social Sciences in Practice. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 47(1): 3–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393116654869

36. MacKenzie D. A. (2006) An engine, not a camera: How financial models shape markets, MIT Press.

37. Mäki U. (2009) Economics Imperialism: Concept and Constraints. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39(3): 351–380. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393108319023

38. McCaffree K. (2018) A sociological formalization of Searle’s social ontology. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 48(3): 330–349. https://doi.org/10.1111/jtsb.12172

39. Mol A. (1999) Ontological Politics. A Word and Some Questions. The Sociological Review, 47: 74–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1999.tb03483.x

40. Okasha S. (2017) Biology and the Theory of Rationality. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107295490.009

41. Okasha S. (2018) Agents and goals in evolution (First edition), Oxford University Press.

42. Okasha S. & Binmore K. (2012) Evolution and Rationality: Decisions, Co-operation and Strategic Behaviour, Cambridge University Press. https://books.google.com?id=vkqq2RzRox8C

43. Psillos S. (1999) Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth (0th ed.), Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203979648

44. Rakoczy H. & Tomasello M. (2007) The Ontogeny of Social Ontology: Steps to Shared Intentionality and Status Functions. In S. L. Tsohatzidis (Ed.) Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle’s Social Ontology (pp. 113–137), Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6104-2_5

45. Ross D. (2008) Ontic Structural Realism and Economics. Philosophy of Science, 75(5): 732–743. https://doi.org/10.1086/594518

46. Sarkia M., Kaidesoja T. & Hyyryläinen M. (2020) Mechanistic explanations in the cognitive social sciences: Lessons from three case studies. Social Science Information, 59(4): 580–603. https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018420968742

47. Searle J. (1995) The Construction of Social Reality, Simon and Schuster. https://books.google.com?id=zrLQwJCcoOsC

48. Searle J. R. (2008) Language and social ontology. Theory and Society, 37(5): 443–459. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-008-9068-y

49. Shevchenko V. (2023) Coordination as Naturalistic Social Ontology: Constraints and Explanation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 004839312211504. https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221150486

50. Sober E. (1983) Equilibrium explanation. Philosophical Studies, 43(2): 201–210. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372383

51. Sperber D. (1996) Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach, Blackwell.

52. Sperber D. (2011) A naturalistic ontology for mechanistic explanations in the social sciences. In P. Demeulenaere (Ed.) Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms (pp. 64–77), Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511921315.004

53. Sun R. (2012) Grounding Social Sciences in Cognitive Sciences, MIT Press. https://books.google.com?id=Dd3xCwAAQBAJ

54. Tuomela R. (2002) The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View (1st ed.), Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511487446

55. Turner S. (2018) Cognitive Science and the Social: A Primer (1st ed.), Routledge. https:// doi.org/10.4324/9781351180528

56. Turner S. (2007) Social Theory as a Cognitive Neuroscience. European Journal of Social Theory, 10(3): 357–374. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431007080700

57. Turner S. (2019) Verstehen Naturalized. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 49(4): 243–264. https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393119847102

58. Vanderschraaf P. (2001) Learning and coordination: Inductive deliberation, equilibrium, and convention, Routledge.

59. Weber M. (1924) Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, Mohr.

60. Worrall J. (1989) Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds? Dialectica, 43(1-2): 99–124. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1989.tb00933.x