High-ranking Officials of the Presidential Administration: Historical Dynamics of Employment after Leaving Office

The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the characteristics of the post-career of high-ranking PA officials who left their positions under President Yeltsin and in the post-Yeltsin period - and the factors that determine them. The empirical basis of the study is a database that includes biographical questionnaires on AP figures who at least once left a key position in this body. The study showed that the role of federal executive authorities (including the government of the Russian Federation and law enforcement agencies) as a channel of post-career has increased. Transitions to the federal parliament are rare in both eras, but the proportion of officials who ended up in the State Duma after their resignation (especially a year later) slightly decreased, while the proportion of those who moved to the Federation Council, on the contrary, slightly increased in the post-Yeltsin period as a whole. While transitions to regional administrations were rare in both periods, PA officials were noticeably more likely to become governors in the post-Yeltsin era, which was facilitated by a centralization of power. Finally, the share of transitions from government to business is similar in both periods, as are their other characteristics: the dominance of big business as a place of work and the distribution of firms that have adopted officials by form of ownership. The pantouflage was aided by high salaries in big business and the firms' interest in recruiting officials in the context of crony capitalism.

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