“An Art Not to Be Attended at Idle Times”: Reason and Violence in Thucydides

Abstract

The article examines the problem of interconnection between strategic, political, and technical aspects of organized violence in Thucydides’ “History of Peloponnesian War” in its most complex and effective form — maneuver naval combat. According to Thucydides, it is the ability to conduct prolonged naval and land campaigns — with an ability to concentrate force and resources and to pose decisive long-term goals — that distinguishes modernity from antiquity, civilization from barbarism and thus marks the first major conflict between coalitions of Greek polices as a most significant event in human history. Our research proposes a new approach to Thucydides’ work, which views his description of struggle between Athens and Corinth for the control of Naupactus in 429–413 BC as a pivotal moment of the whole conflict. A small port controlling the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf decides whether Athens can confine its naval power to the Peloponnesian League — or whether the maritime struggle becomes uncontrollable and presents a mutual threat to communication lines. This confrontation is the most complete and clear demonstration of the technical features and capabilities of the main instrument of this form of violence — the rowing fleet of triremes — as well as social, ethical and strategic aspects of the society which was capable of creating it. The history of struggle in a specific theatre of a specific war develops into a universal statement about the disclosure of human nature by means of organized violence, which influenced postThucydidean tradition of political thought.