Elections, Regime Type, and Risks of Revolutionary Destabilization. A Quantitative Analysis

This article is devoted to the study of the nature of the influence of elections on the risks of revolutionary destabilization. The authors study different approaches to estimating the probability of revolutionary events in an election year. Different types of revolutionary events are distinguished within the framework of the level of political violence. The primary reasons for the activation of the politically active part of the population, both in autocracies and in transitional political regimes, are identified, including the factionalization of elites, the activation of “sleeping” institutions, the growth of political competence among individuals, the consolidation of the pro-democratic opposition and its institutionalization, electoral fraud and other manifestations of unfair political competition, greater emotional involvement of the population in political processes, and so on. The findings support the conclusion that elections promote peaceful revolutionary episodes and reduce the likelihood of armed uprisings. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that the influence of elections on the risks of revolutionary destabilization is considered in the regime context. The authors explore how elections affect violent or non-violent revolutionary actions in certain political regimes, according to Jack A. Goldstone’s typology (full autocracies, partial autocracies, factional democracies, partial democracies and full democracies). The authors conclude that holding elections reduces the risks of armed revolutionary destabilization in all types of regimes, except for factional democracies. On the other hand, unarmed revolutionary action is more likely in an election year — in all regime types except full democracies. At the same time, holding elections primarily increases the risks of unarmed revolutionary uprisings in intermediate regimes / anocracies. However, even among anocracies, factional democracies stand out, where in the election year the risks of unarmed (as well as armed) revolutionary episodes increase significantly more than in partial autocracies and in partial non-factional democracies. At the same time, for consolidated democracies, holding elections is a factor that inhibits rather than provokes revolutionary destabilization. In full autocracies, the risk of unarmed revolutionary action increases in an election year, but not as much as in intermediate regimes.

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