Preview

Sociology of Power

Advanced search

“The Critique of Anthropological Reason”: Indubitable Truth and Cuban Divination

https://doi.org/10.22394/2074-0492-2021-4-147-168

Abstract

This paper approaches the study of ‘apparently irrational beliefs' in anthropology. The author traces how the debate that emerged in the 1960s around Evans-Pritchard's work on Azande magic has developed in the context of the ontological turn. The author focuses on how Martin Holbraad is engaged in the debate. Holbraad argues that Evans-Pritchard was the forerunner of the ontological turn. His followers have overlooked his argument about the fundamental difference between ‘empirical causality' and ‘mystical causality'. Holbraad develops Evans-Pritchard's idea by drawing on his empirical study of Cuban practices of Ifa divination. He seeks to prove that the region of ‘mystical causality' is autonomous. This region has a ‘movable ontology', which makes it possible to have alternative criteria for the truth of predictors. In turn, these criteria allow the verdicts of the oracles to be regarded as indubitable truth. Holbraad suggests exploiting the unrepresentative truth of oracles and rewriting anthropology's epistemological foundations so that anthropologists can formulate truth statements but do not allow for the existence of universal criteria of judgment. However, this move fails because Holbraad admits a contradiction by justifying the autonomy of the two regions of causality. According to some of his assertions, the two regions are interdependent: each is a "condition” or "prerequisite” of the other, though logically, they are incompatible. The author proposes a solution that makes it possible to define an independent ground for both regions. He analyses how Holbraad and De Castro understand the concept of belief and suggests an alternative conceptualisation of belief, referring to interpretations of Wittgenstein's "On Certainty”.

About the Author

Maria Volkova
RANEPA
Russian Federation

MA in Sociology



References

1. Bardina S. (2014) Is It Possible That Sociologists are always Critics, and Critics are always sociologists? Conceptualisation of Research Critique in Wittgensteinian Theory. Sociology of Power (4): 79-96. EDN: THXSRZ

2. Wittgerstein (1994) Philosophical investigations. V.1. Gnosis.

3. Castro de E. (2017) Cannibal Metaphysics. The frontiers of poststructural anthropology. Ad Marginem. - in Russ.

4. Evans-Pritchard E. E. (2004) Theories of primitive religion. ОGI. - in Russ.

5. Evans-Pritchard E. E. (1994) Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande. Respiblica. - in Russ.

6. Apter A. (2017) Ethnographic X-files and Holbraad's double-bind: Reflections on an ontological turn of events. HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory, 7(1): 287-302.

7. De Castro E. B. (2015) The relative native: Essays on Indigenous conceptual worlds. Chicago, IL: Hau Books.

8. Coliva A. (2010). Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist? Philosophical Investigations, 33(1): 1-23.

9. Colvia A. (2013) Which hinge epistemology? // International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 2016. (V. 6), 2-3, 79-96.

10. Evans-Pritchard E. E. (1937) Witchcraft, oracles and magic among the Azande (Vol. 12). London: Oxford.

11. Graeber D. (2015) Radical alterity is just another way of saying "reality" a reply to Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. HAU: journal of ethnographic theory, 5(2): 1-41.

12. Holbraad M. (2009) Ontography and alterity: Defining anthropological truth. Social Analysis, 53(2): 80-93.

13. Holbraad M., Pedersen, M. A. (2017) The ontological turn: an anthropological exposition. Cambridge University Press.

14. Holbraad M. (2012) Truth in motion. University of Chicago Press.

15. Holbraad M. (2012) Truth beyond doubt: Ifa oracles in Havana. HAU: Journal of ethnographic theory, 2(1): 81-109.

16. Holbraad M. (2020). The shapes of relations: Anthropology as conceptual morphology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 50(6), 495-522. EDN: JQQLIZ

17. Hollis M. (1967) The limits of irrationality. European Journal of Sociology/Archives Europeennes de Sociologie, 8(2): 265-271.

18. Kripke S. A. (1972) Naming and necessity. Semantics of natural language. Springer, Dordrecht: 253-355.

19. Kusch M. (2013). Annalisa Coliva on Wittgenstein and epistemic relativism. Philosophia, 41(1), 37-49.

20. Kusch M. (2021). Disagreement, Certainties, Relativism. Topoi, 1-9.

21. Lukes S. (1994) Some problems about rationality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. MacIntyre A. (1964) Is understanding religion compatible with believing? In Faith and the Philosophers (pp. 115-133). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

22. Moyal-Sharrock D. (2004). Understanding Wittgenstein's on certainty. Springer Moyal-Sharrock D. (2021). Certainty in Action: Wittgenstein on Language, Mind and Epistemology. Bloomsbury Publishing.

23. Sperber D. (1982) Apparently irrational beliefs. Rationality and relativism: 149180.

24. Streeter J. (2020). Should we worry about belief? Anthropological Theory, 20(2), 133156.

25. Wagner R (2016) The invention of culture. University of Chicago Press.

26. Winch P. (1964) Understanding a primitive society. American philosophical quarterly, 1(4): 307-324.

27. Wright C. (2004) Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free?). The Aristotelian Society Supplementary, (78): 167-212.


Review

For citations:


Volkova M. “The Critique of Anthropological Reason”: Indubitable Truth and Cuban Divination. Sociology of Power. 2021;33(4):147-168. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.22394/2074-0492-2021-4-147-168

Views: 12


Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.


ISSN 2074-0492 (Print)
ISSN 2413-144X (Online)