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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">socofpower</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Социология власти</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Sociology of Power</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2074-0492</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2413-144X</issn><publisher><publisher-name>The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22394/2074-0492-2024-1-146-171</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">socofpower-54</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СТАТЬИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ARTICLES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Высокопоставленные чиновники Администрации Президента РФ:  историческая динамика занятости после ухода с должности</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>High-ranking Officials of the Presidential Administration: Historical Dynamics of Employment after Leaving Office</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5442-7585</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Тев</surname><given-names>Д. Б.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Tev</surname><given-names>D. B.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Тев Денис Борисович — кандидат социологических наук, старший научный сотрудник</p><p>Санкт-Петербург</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Denis B. Tev — Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Senior researcher</p><p>St Petersburg</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">denis_tev@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Социологический институт РАН — филиал ФНИСЦ РАН<country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">The Sociological Institute of the RAS<country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2024</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>30</day><month>01</month><year>2024</year></pub-date><volume>36</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>146</fpage><lpage>171</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Тев Д.Б., 2024</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2024</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Тев Д.Б.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Tev D.B.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://socofpower.ranepa.ru/jour/article/view/54">https://socofpower.ranepa.ru/jour/article/view/54</self-uri><abstract><p>Статья посвящена сравнительному анализу характеристик посткарьеры высокопоставленных чиновников АП, покинувших должность при президенте Ельцине и в послеельцинский период, и факторов, их обусловливающих. Эмпирической основой исследования служит база данных, включающая биографические анкеты деятелей АП, которые хотя бы однажды выбывали с ключевой должности в этом органе. Исследование показало, что возросла роль федеральных органов исполнительной власти, включая Правительство РФ и силовые ведомства, как канала посткарьеры. Политическими событиями, способствовавшими миграции из АП в федеральную исполнительную власть, стали переход президента на пост премьер-министра в 2008 г. и рокировка президента и премьер-министра в 2012 г. Кроме того, стабилизация кадров АП при Путине и Медведеве способствовала сокращению спроса на ключевые позиции в исполнительной власти, облегчая трудоустройство. Переходы в федеральный парламент редки в обе эпохи, но в послеельцинский период в целом доля чиновников, оказавшихся в ГД после отставки, несколько снизилась, а доля тех, кто перешел в Совет Федерации (СФ), немного возросла. Ослабление автономии легислатуры могло способствовать снижению привлекательности законодательных позиций для чиновников Администрации Президента (АП). Однако усиление контроля президента над Федеральным собранием (ФС) при Путине отчасти облегчало рекрутирование туда деятелей АП, расширив президентские возможности продвигать доверенных лиц на высшие парламентские посты. Также изменение порядка формирования СФ увеличило количество законодательных позиций, доступных отставным президентским бюрократам. Переходы в региональные администрации редки в оба периода, но в после     ельцинское время чиновники АП чаще становились губернаторами, чему способствовала централизация власти. Наконец, доля переходов из правительства в бизнес, а также роль крупного бизнеса, как места работы, и распределение принявших чиновников фирм по форме собственности сходны в оба периода. Пантуфляжу способствовали высокие доходы в бизнесе и заинтересованность фирм в привлечении чиновников, усиленная кумовским капитализмом.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>The article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the characteristics of the post-career of high-ranking PA officials who left their positions under President Yeltsin and in the post-Yeltsin period - and the factors that determine them. The empirical basis of the study is a database that includes biographical questionnaires on AP figures who at least once left a key position in this body. The study showed that the role of federal executive authorities (including the government of the Russian Federation and law enforcement agencies) as a channel of post-career has increased. Transitions to the federal parliament are rare in both eras, but the proportion of officials who ended up in the State Duma after their resignation (especially a year later) slightly decreased, while the proportion of those who moved to the Federation Council, on the contrary, slightly increased in the post-Yeltsin period as a whole. While transitions to regional administrations were rare in both periods, PA officials were noticeably more likely to become governors in the post-Yeltsin era, which was facilitated by a centralization of power. Finally, the share of transitions from government to business is similar in both periods, as are their other characteristics: the dominance of big business as a place of work and the distribution of firms that have adopted officials by form of ownership. The pantouflage was aided by high salaries in big business and the firms' interest in recruiting officials in the context of crony capitalism.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>Администрация Президента</kwd><kwd>карьера после ухода с должности</kwd><kwd>федеральная администрация</kwd><kwd>правительство</kwd><kwd>губернаторы</kwd><kwd>парламент</kwd><kwd>бизнес</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>Presidential Administration</kwd><kwd>career after leaving office</kwd><kwd>federal administration</kwd><kwd>government</kwd><kwd>governors</kwd><kwd>parliament</kwd><kwd>business</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Гладышева А. А., Кишилова Ю. О. (2018) Влияние политических связей и государственной собственности на деятельность фирм в России. Корпоративные финансы, 12 (1): 20-43. 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