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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">socofpower</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Социология власти</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Sociology of Power</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2074-0492</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2413-144X</issn><publisher><publisher-name>The Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id custom-type="edn" pub-id-type="custom">PKAYRW</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">socofpower-369</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>СТАТЬИ</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>ARTICLES</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Массовый редистриктинг и распределительная политика: эмпирический анализ на примере регионов России</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Mass Redistricting and Distributive Politics: Evidence from Russia’s Regions</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><contrib-id contrib-id-type="orcid">https://orcid.org/0009-0009-5278-7232</contrib-id><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Девятников</surname><given-names>В. Ю.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Devyatnikov</surname><given-names>V. Y.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Вадим Юрьевич Девятников, стажер-исследователь, аспирант</p><p>Международный центр изучения институтов и развития; Аспирантская школа по политическим наукам</p><p>Москва</p><p>Научные интересы: электоральные исследования, электоральные автократии, региональные выборы</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Vadim Y. Devyatnikov, research assistant, PhD student</p><p>International Center for the Study of Institutions and Development; Doctoral School of Political Science</p><p>Moscow</p><p>Research interests: electoral studies, electoral autocracies, and regional elections</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">vdevyatnikov@hse.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru">Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики»<country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en">National Research University Higher School of Economics<country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>20</day><month>12</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>37</volume><issue>4</issue><fpage>163</fpage><lpage>185</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Девятников В.Ю., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Девятников В.Ю.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Devyatnikov V.Y.</copyright-holder><license license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://socofpower.ranepa.ru/jour/article/view/369">https://socofpower.ranepa.ru/jour/article/view/369</self-uri><abstract><p>   Редистриктинг является важным инструментом политической борьбы, который обладает рядом характеристик, выделяющих его среди других способов создания неконкурентного электорального преимущества: скрытность и непровокативность. Этим обусловлено значительное внимание исследователей, прикованное в первую очередь к политическим последствиям редистриктинга. Тем не менее политико-управленческая и правовая стороны редистриктинга остаются менее изученными, что может ограничивать наше понимание электоральных процессов, особенно за пределами США, на материалах которых была выполнена большая часть статей на эту тему. Используя прошедшую в ряде регионов в период с 2019 по 2021 годы электоральную реформу, сопровождающуюся массовым редистриктингом, текущая работа нацелена на установление политико-управленческих последствий редистриктинга как правовой процедуры на уровне регионов России. Для этой цели с помощью авторского алгоритма были собраны данные о качестве предоставляемых государством благ, а также об объеме их финансирования. С использованием метода событий, позволяющего интерпретировать результаты в каузальном ключе, была получена оценка влияния редистриктинга на качество предоставляемых благ и объем их финансирования. Результаты свидетельствуют о повышении запланированных расходов на образование за год до проведения выборов в муниципальных образованиях, в которых не менее чем на 25 % и 50 % УИКов не было инкумбентов. Полученные результаты не позволяют говорить о значительном влиянии массового редистриктинга на распределение финансовых ресурсов, выделяемых на предоставляемые государством блага. В то же время можно отметить наличие умеренных свидетельств в пользу предположения о том, что проведение реформы положительно сказалось на качестве предоставляемых благ.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>   Redistricting is an important tool of political struggle, distinguished by several features that set it apart from other methods of creating a non-competitive electoral advantage: secrecy and non-provocativeness. These characteristics have led to significant scholarly attention, primarily focused on the political consequences of redistricting. However, the administrative and legal aspects of redistricting remain less studied, which may limit our understanding of electoral processes, especially outside the United States—the context of most existing research on the topic. Drawing on the electoral reform that took place in several Russian regions between 2019 and 2021 and was accompanied by mass redistricting, this study aims to examine the administrative and political consequences of redistricting as a legal procedure at the regional level in Russia. For this purpose, data were collected using a custom algorithm on the quality of public goods provision and the volume of their funding. Using the event study method, which allows for causal interpretation, the impact of redistricting on the quality and funding of public goods was assessed. The results indicate an increase in planned education expenditures in the year preceding elections in municipalities where at least 25 % and 50 % of precinct election commissions (PECs) did not have incumbents. The findings do not provide strong evidence of a significant impact of mass redistricting on the allocation of financial resources for publicly provided goods. However, there is moderate evidence to support the hypothesis that the reform had a positive effect on the quality of the goods provided.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>редистриктинг</kwd><kwd>бюджетно-распределительная политика</kwd><kwd>электоральные исследования</kwd><kwd>региональные выборы</kwd><kwd>региональное законодательство</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>redistricting</kwd><kwd>distributive budget policy</kwd><kwd>electoral studies</kwd><kwd>regional elections</kwd><kwd>subnational legislation</kwd></kwd-group><funding-group xml:lang="ru"><funding-statement>Исследование выполнено в рамках Программы фундаментальных исследований НИУ ВШЭ</funding-statement></funding-group><funding-group xml:lang="en"><funding-statement>The study was conducted within the framework of the HSE Fundamental Research Program</funding-statement></funding-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Ansolabehere S., Snyder J. 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