Svetlana M. Bardina

RANEPA, Moscow, Russia
ORCID: 0000-0002-3269-8488

The Epistemic Significance of Maintaining Consistency in Confabulations

Abstract:
The paper examines the epistemic significance of maintaining consistency in confabulations. It has been argued recently that confabulations might have some positive epistemic features; notable among them is maintaining a consistent set of beliefs about oneself. This paper focuses on confabulatory beliefs which are not connected with a self-concept. However, it is demonstrated that such beliefs might contribute to maintaining narrative consistency and thus also yield some epistemic benefits. The author analyzes cases of confabulations concerning legends and fairy-tales, and shows how confabulatory utterances contribute to the maintenance of consistency. The examples analyzed include both clinical and non-clinical confabulations; yet, in all instances, confabulations contribute to maintaining narrative consistency. Subsequently, the author compares the ways of maintaining consistency in confabulations and in mundane cognition. Based on Melvin Pollner's conception of mundane reasoning, it is demonstrated that maintaining consistency is a fundamental principle of organizing mundane accounts. It is also proposed that basic principles of mundane cognition have substantial epistemic functions; among them, their foundational role and their contribution to the sense of ontological security are of particular importance. Finally, it is shown that confabulations of a certain type might have the same epistemic functions. Consequently, producing confabulatory accounts might yield significant epistemic benefits in certain cases.

Keywords: confabulation, consistency, epistemology, mundane reason, ontological security, Pollner

Светлана М. Бардина[1]

РАНХиГС, Москва, Россия

Эпистемическая значимость последовательных ложных воспоминаний

Резюме:

В статье анализируется эпистемический аспект проблемы поддержания последовательных ложных воспоминаний. В ряде исследований недавно было высказано предположение, что поддержание ложных воспоминаний может давать эпистемические преимущества; в частности, это связано с тем, что они могут способствовать поддержанию связного представления о себе. Данная статья также рассматривает проблему связности, однако фокусируется не на проблеме поддержания связных представлений о себе, а на проблеме достижения последовательности нарратива. Этот вопрос раскрывается на материале анализа ложных воспоминаний, которые возникают при воспроизведении сюжетов легенд и сказок. Показано, что мнимые воспоминания о сюжетных поворотах сказок и легенд позволяют поддерживать последовательность нарратива. В тексте разбираются и клинические, и неклинические примеры ложных воспоминаний; несмотря на различную этиологию, во всех случаях можно наблюдать сходные функции ложных воспоминаний. Далее автор сравнивает способы, которые используются для поддержания последовательности рассказа при ложных воспоминаниях, и способы, которые служат той же задаче в обыденном мышлении (mundane reasoning). Согласно концепции Мелвина Поллнера, поддержание последовательности — это один из фундаментальных принципов организации повседневных описаний (accounts). Эти принципы имеют важные эпистемические функции; наиболее важными из них являются функция обоснования знания и их роль в поддержании «онтологической безопасности». Далее автор приходит к заключению, что ложные воспоминания могут выполнять аналогичные эпистемические функции. Таким образом, показано, как мнимые воспоминания определенного типа могут иметь позитивное эпистемическое значение.

Ключевые слова: конфабуляция, ложные воспоминания, мнимые воспоминания, обыденное мышление, онтологическая безопасность, Поллнер, принцип последовательности, эпистемология

185

The concept of confabulation is characterized by varying interpretations of its definition [Glowinski at al. 2008]; it has been considered

1   Бардина Светлана Михайловна — кандидат философских наук, старший научный сотрудник Международного центра современной социологической теории МВШСЭН, старший научный сотрудник Центра социологических исследований РАНХиГС. Научные интересы: социология психиатрии, философия психиатрии, философия обыденного языка. E-mail: neology@bk.ru

as an *epistemic* phenomenon by various scholars [Berrios 2000; Bortolotti 2010; Bortolotti, Cox 2009; Michaelian 2011, 2016; Hirstein 2005]. According to the epistemic account, confabulation is primarily an epistemically faulty form of cognition. One of the key features of a confabulation is producing false, ill-grounded [Hirstein 2005], or inaccurate [Berrious 2000] thoughts.

Recently it has been suggested [Sullivan-Bissett 2015] that confabulation, despite being fallacious, could also have some positive epistemic features. As stated by Sullivan-Bissett [2015], one of the two most important epistemic benefits of confabulation isits contribution to maintaining consistency. This argument might seem to contradict the traditional view on confabulation. Moscovitch [1995: 228] indicated that confabulatory accounts do not need to be coherent and internally consistent. Solms [2014: 135] stated the same, noting that tolerance for internal inconsistencies is a distinctive feature of confabulations. But while confabulations are often incoherent, *some* confabulatory explanations might still contribute to the maintenance of consistency.

For instance, Moscovitch [1995] wrote about a patient who suffered from impaired autobiographical memory. This patient had a confabulatory belief that he had been married for four months, while in fact he had been married for over thirty years; he also held a true belief that he had four children. This view was internally inconsistent. But after being asked how he had managed to get four children in four months, he responded that his wife and he had adopted them. Although the patient had an inconsequent set of beliefs about himself, the subsequent confabulation made his autobiography more consistent. Sullivan-Bissett gives another example of a non-clinical confabulatory explanation guided by implicit bias. Roger thinks of himself as an egalitarian, but he does not invite any female applicants to the interview stage. Being asked to explain his decision in a particular case, Roger incorrectly asserts that — according to the CV– the female applicant is not qualified for the job. This confabulatory explanation allows Roger to 'make consistent his belief that he is egalitarian, and his belief that he did not invite Katie to interview' [Sullivan-Bissett 2015: 556]. So, some confabulations, clinical or non-clinical, might contribute to a greater consistency of a person's beliefs.

Still, the epistemic advantage of maintaining consistency has not yet been sufficiently clarified. Sullivan-Bissett explains it with reference to the necessity to sustain a coherent self-concept. For example, in the case of Roger the confabulatory explanation enabled him to maintain a consistent set of beliefs about himself. Maintaining a coherent self-concept clearly is a psychological benefit [Bortolotti 2015; McKay, Dennett 2009]. It also might be indirectly epistemically beneficial: an inconsistent set of beliefs about oneself leads to discomfort which might negatively affect one's capacity to function well epistemically [Sullivan-Bissett 2015:

186

557]. Conversely, having beliefs which protect one from an uncertain sense of self and from lowself-esteem, 'a person will be more likely to engage with her surrounding physical and social environment in a way that is conducive to epistemic achievements' [Bortolotti 2015: 496].

However, maintaining consistency is not necessarily connected with a person's self-concept. Some confabulatory explanations fill gaps and aid consistency; but not all confabulatory beliefs are *about oneself*. The purpose of this paper is to show that any confabulation which contributes to consistency yields significant epistemic benefits. For this purpose, I will demonstrate the epistemic significance of maintaining consistency in mundane cognition and then examine whether this applies to confabulation.

In this paper both clinical and non-clinical — or broad [Bernecker 2017] — confabulation will be examined. Scholars including Berrios [2000], Coltheart [2017], Hirstein [2005], Stolzenberg and Pezdek [2013] compared clinical confabulations 'which arise in the context of neurological disease' [Kopelman 2010: 215] and non-clinical confabulations on various grounds. Maintaining that there is a difference between clinical and broad confabulation, they argue that they share some common *epistemic* features. Since this paper deals with the epistemic significance of confabulation, the difference between clinical and non-clinical confabulation does not play a key role for the present purposes.

187

Narrative consistency in confabulation

In the first section, I will introduce a particular type of confabulation — confabulation concerning legends and fairy tales which contribute to the maintenance of narrative consistency. The cases discussed below illustrate how confabulatory accounts help to obtain consistency among several utterances. These examples are especially important for this study, as confabulations of that type are not connected with maintaining a person's self-concept and cannot thus influence self-esteem. Yet, they might still produce significant epistemic gain.

A clinical case: Little Red Riding Hood

Delbecq-Derouesne et al. [1990] described a patient suffering from an aneurysm of the anterior communicating artery. This patient produced a normal number of correct responses in tasks of recall, whereas in recognition tasks his performance was comparable to that of patients with amnesia Delbecq-Derouesne et al. 1990: 1046].Being tested for the level of semantic memory, the patient was asked to tell a well-known story of Little Red Riding Hood. He produced a number of confabulations, combined with a correct reproduction of some elements. Afterwards he was

asked specific questions regarding different details of the story; his answers indicated that he knew the tale well.

Let us consider a fragment of his first narration:

> *Well, there was a grandmother, a wolf and LRRH. LRRH went to see her grandmother... She went through woods and came across a wolf. He ate LRRH, didn't he? No, he almost did... LRRH had food for tea in her basket... Surely the wolf bolted her tea-things because he didn't eat LRRH. So, LRRH left her basket somewhere while going to her grandmother's. Then, the wolf arrived, he wanted to eat LRRH. But he only bolted what was in the basket... Well, that's the whole story. LRRH, very distressed, arrived at the house of her grandmother, who must certainly have cuddled her, if she had been a good granny.* [Delbecq-Derouesne et al. 1990: 1073].

As can be seen in this fragment, the patient remembered that 1) LRRH went through the woods; 2) the wolf wanted to eat her; 3) she survived. However, there was a gap in the story caused by the memory impairment. The first scene was incomplete: 'She went through woods and came across a wolf. He ate LRRH, didn't he? No'. To make the narration more consistent, the subject had to fill the gap, which was done by adding confabulatory episodes. These fictitious episodes, inter alia, referred to another detail of the original tale which the patient remembered (LRRH had food for tea in her basket). The final version of the story combined correct and confabulatory episodes. Nonetheless, it was internally coherent: LRRH left her basket with food behind, and the wolf was misled by this food.

Örulv [2006: 651] points out that confabulatory utterances might be understood first and foremost as a form of narrative discourse. Considering this story through the lens of narrative consistency, adding confabulatory episodes made it more coherent.

A non-clinical case: The War of the Ghosts

As another example, I will consider the experiment on the reproduction of folk-stories carried out by Frederic Bartlett [1920]. The participants read folk-stories which were developed in a community very different from that to which they belonged, and contained striking, curious, and often unfamiliar incidents and names [Bartlett 1920: 32]. After reading stories twice, subjects produced a series of retellings, separated by time. The first reproductions occurred fifteen minutes after the original study of the material; subsequently, participants reproduced the stories repeatedly over months. The retold stories significantly changed after a number of reproductions. Particularly, the participants added new details and even confabulatory elements not present in the original narrations.

188

Bartlett revealed several principles which guided the transformations of the original stories; one of them — 'the effort to rationalize' — will be considered in detail. Bartlett [1920: 37] defined it as 'a common tendency to change all presented material into such a form that it may be accepted without uneasiness, and without question'. The tendency of 'rationalization' can be illustrated by the transformations of the legend collected by Boas, *The War of the Ghosts*. This legend tells a story of a young Indian who went to a fight. The final episode of the original story was the following:

> In the fight he hears somebody say: "That young Indian has been hit," but he feels no hurt. He merely remarks casually: "Oh, they are ghosts." He goes back home, tells his friends, lights a fire, and the next morning at sunrise falls down: "something black came from his mouth. He was dead." [Bartlett 1920: 37]

Starting from very early reproductions, all mentions of ghosts dropped out from the narration; that could be explained by a tendency to replace unfamiliar and strange details with more familiar ones [Bartlett 1920: 36]. In reproductions, it was not a ghost, but one of the warriors who pointed out the wound: 'Then one of the warriors called out to the young Indian: "Go back home now, for you are wounded"' [Bartlett 1920: 38]. It is worth noting that even though this transformation resulted in further inconsistencies, it still made the story more coherent in some respect. The original story was not a fantastic tale; it combined elements which seemed realistic and not realistic to the British participants. Wounds, warriors, and fights were compatible with the subjects' view on how a realistic story must have looked like — but ghosts did not. The later version of the tale contained only the elements which seemed realistic.

But eventually, this change led to inconsistencies. In the original story, the ghosts' role was crucial for the plot. When the ghosts were substituted by a warrior, the story became internally incoherent: the painless wound and the death of the main character were not logically connected anymore. What is more, the cause of his death was unclear. Later reproductions of the story contained new confabulatory details which linked these episodes. After a few iterations, the story was recounted like this:

> During the fight the young man fell wounded, with an arrow through his heart. Then he said to the warrior: "Take me back to Momapan; that is where I live."

Then:

> In the course of the battle the Indian was mortally wounded. Take me home," he said, "to Momapan. That is where I come from. I am going to die." [Bartlett 1920: 39].

In the previous reproduction, the painless wound — as well as the hero's death — remained unexplained. A confabulatory episode where the In-

189

dian was mortally wounded addressed that problem; a sequence of disconnected and uncaused events turned into a consistent story. In the latest versions, the Indian was wounded by an arrow, and it caused his death. A wound in the heart seemed to be a more convincing reason for the hero's death than a wound which was received in an unexplained and painless way.

Thus, after the first transformations, the folk-story grew more consistent concerning its realism yet became internally incoherent. The story contained two elements which were not very well matched; thus, it was self-contradictory. After further confabulatory transformations, the story became more consistent.

In the two given cases of the retelling of *Little Red Riding Hood* and *The War of the Ghosts* stories contained gaps because subjects had no access to the correct information. In the first case this memory gap was caused by clinical impairment; in the second case it was caused by the tendency to replace unfamiliar details. In any case, in both cases knowledge gaps led to inconsistencies; further confabulations eliminated these inconsistencies.

So, in addition to confabulations connected with the stability of the self-concept, there might be confabulations aimed only at maintaining narrative consistency. In the following sections, I will explain why achieving consistency brings substantial epistemic benefits regardless of the content of the confabulation.

Maintaining consistency as a principle of mundane cognition

A tendency to maintain consistency is not only typical for confabulations. In this section, I will reconstruct the conception that maintaining consistency is the fundamental principle in the organization of mundane accounts. Later, its epistemic significance will be discussed.

Melvin Pollner [1987] recognizes the principle of consistency as one of the main assumptions of mundane cognition. Based on empirical research of traffic court transactions, Pollner identifies the most basic principles which guide the practice of producing accounts of 'what happened'. These principles constitute *mundane reason*, a set of basic beliefs about reality which is a necessary condition for perceiving and describing the world.

For mundane reasoners, it is taken for granted that the external world exists. The presence of the world is deeply entwined in any form of inquiry or social activity, as it is implicated in the description of particular events as they occurred in reality. Mundane reason also presupposes that the world is determinate and definite. Every object, event and process in the world is 'determinate, coherent and non-contradictory' [Pollner 1987: 17].

These ontological assumptions imply a certain epistemology. Mundane reason anticipates that 'accounts and experiences, individually and collectively, will [normally] reflect the assumed structure of reality' [Pollner 1987: 17]. Different accounts constitute a coherent representation of objects and situations; all contradictions can potentially be resolved. Mundane reasons' anticipations for any account go beyond being internally coherent. An account of a particular object should be 'compatible with every other [known] state of affairs which comprises the world' [Pollner 1987: 41]. This principle makes it possible to sustain a view of the world as the 'Great Object' [Merleau-Ponty 1968: 15], or as a uniform and consistent entity. Thus, mundane cognition expects objects and processes to be internally and externally coherent. Correspondingly, accounts which represent them are anticipated to be consistent.

Laypeople organize their experiences and reports on them in accordance with basic assumptions of mundane reason. For example, conflicting accounts of the same object or event require a choice regarding which of these accounts will be accredited as the legitimate version of the world and which will be dismissed. The choice between different versions of 'what happened' cannot be made with reference to empirical terms alone [Pollner 1975: 419].When several conflicting reports are given, accounts which are internally consistent and compatible with other known accounts are more likely to be 'recognized' as true descriptions of reality. Pollner describes a traffic court judge who dealt with the case of an improper left turn. 'Hearing a defendant's claim that he made both a left and a right turn simultaneously', the judge knows that this claim cannot be correct, without the need for any empirical evidence [Pollner 1987: 27]. More than that, people evaluate not only reports but their own experiences of reality according to the same principles [Weinberg 2012: 81].

The principles of mundane reasoning also influence the ways of reconstructing unknown details and filling gaps in experiences and reports. Analyzing the working practices of judges, Pollner [1987: 34] points out that 'the process of interpretation through which the judge organizes the disparate pieces of information into a possible version of a scene in the world is guided by mundane suppositions regarding the coherency and determinateness of objects'. Pollner 1987: 62] gives an example of a judge who dealt with two conflicting reports regarding a car's speed — one of them produced by a defendant and another one produced by a police officer. The judge suggested that the speedometer must have malfunctioned, resulting in the defendant's mistaken account. There could be a number of other versions which the judge might have accepted: a lying defendant, a misjudgment on the side of the police officer, etc. None of these would have violated the non-contradiction principle.

So, based on empirical observations, Pollner demonstrates that there are a few fundamental principles which guide the production of mun-

dane accounts. People base their descriptions of reality on these principles and dismiss accounts which contradict and consequently 'threaten' mundane reason. They follow these principles even when it might be costly for them. For instance, Sacks [1972: 290] reported that people who were under interrogation for possibly serious offenses were 'more concerned with preserving their claim to consistency than their claim to innocence'.

Thus, organizing accounts according to a number of general assumptions is a fundamental tendency of mundane cognition. From a certain point of view it can be argued that accounts which correspond to the principles of mundane reasoning are epistemically beneficial regardless of whether they are true or false. This position will be clarified in the next section.

The epistemic significance of mundane reasoning

The following section will discuss the epistemic significance of the principle of consistency as a fundamental assumption of mundane cognition. Two main arguments refer to its foundational role and to its contribution to the sense of ontological security.

Foundational role

As previously stated, mundane inquiry is based on general presuppositions about reality; people use these presuppositions to 'make inferences, raise and resolve puzzles' [Pollner 1987: 11]. In other words, people explore what they believe to be real, definite, and intelligible. Scientific research does not differ from mundane cognition in this aspect, as scientists ground their research on the same assumptions: 'Durkheim did not fabricate the social structures; he discovered them', assuming that they are real and definite [Pollner 1987: 15]. Moreover, these general assumptions not only ground but also constrain the production of claims about different events and facts. As shown above, people reject statements which describe the world or particular events in a contradictory or incoherent way. Thus, the assumptions of mundane cognition form the system within which some statements are accredited as true descriptions of reality, while others are not.

This function is important for epistemology since there is a need to ground the practice of justification. Justification is a key epistemic practice; yet, its legitimacy is questionable [Albert 2016/1968]. According to the position of moderatism [Coliva 2015], any justification is grounded only within a system of more general assumptions. The position of moderatism has its foundations in Wittgenstein's argument that 'all testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already

192

within a system' [Wittgenstein 1972/1969, paragraph 105]. For instance, when specific empirical beliefs are at stake, perceptual justification can take place 'only thanks to a system of very general assumptions, such as "There is an external world", "My sense organs work mostly reliably", "I am not a victim of massive perceptual and cognitive deception", and so on' [Coliva 2015: 4]. Thus, the system of such assumptions serves as the foundation for practices of justification. Principles of mundane cognition work in a similar way, as examples from traffic court practices demonstrate. Judges evaluate testimonies based on very general assumptions — such as the principle of non-contradiction.

These general 'framework' [Malcolm 1977; McGinn 1984] principles make empirical inquiries possible. At the same time, these principles play a foundational role when we employ them in our epistemic practices. For instance, when people reject conflicting accounts, they maintain the existing system of testing and justifying. Otherwise the principle of non-contradiction could theoretically be at risk of being regarded as invalid and its foundational role could be threatened.

The principles of mundane cognition make everyday and scientific inquiry possible. Consequently, all accounts which maintain this system are indirectly epistemically beneficial. Particularly, producing internally coherent accounts contributes to maintaining the general principle of consistency as a foundational principle. Although this benefit is indirect, it refers to the very foundation of our cognition and is therefore of great importance.

193

Ontological security

The principle of consistency is also essential for the sense of 'ontological security' [Pollner 1987: 48]. The concept of ontological security was originally introduced by Laing [1965/1960]. An ontologically secure person is somebody who 'has a sense of his integral selfhood and personal identity, of the permanency of things, of the reliability of natural processes, of the substantiality of natural processes, of the substantiality of others' [Laing 1965/1960: 39]. If a position of ontological security has been reached, a person is protected from different forms of anxiety; in contrast, an ontologically insecure person becomes deeply affected by external events.

Though Laing wrote about ontological security and ontological insecurity regarding psychopathology, this distinction was later applied to non-pathological states as well. Particularly, Giddens [1991] applied these terms to contemporary late modernity in general, which is epitomized by uncertainty and turmoil which threatens ontological security. For Giddens [1991: 40], ontological security is the basis for routine activities, including cognitive capacity; ontological insecurity affects the ability to

act and to explore reality. Notably, a sense of ontological security is the essential condition for successful learning [Shyu 2002]. Thus, questioning such basic beliefs as the substantiality of self and others and the consistency of things leads to ontological insecurity and, consequently, damages a person's cognitive capacity.

The importance of producing internally and externally coherent accounts stems from the necessity to maintain a sense of the permanency of things. This allows people to achieve a sense of ontological security which is essential, among other things, for the 'agent's epistemic functionality' [Bortolotti 2015: 496]. It is important to emphasize that Laing and Giddens state that ontological insecurity arises not only due to threats to the stability of self. Any discredit upon the permanency, coherency, and stability of processes in the outer world leads to the destabilization of ontological security and the subject's epistemic functionality.

Therefore, questioning the principles of mundane cognition is very costly. When fundamental assumptions are questioned or doubted, even indirectly, our cognitive capacity is threatened. That is why accounts which are organized according to the principles of mundane reasoning are epistemically beneficial, regardless of whether they represent reality accurately.

194

Mundane cognition and confabulation

The final section will discuss whether the presented arguments can be applied to confabulation.

In some respects, producing confabulatory accounts is not that different from producing everyday mundane reports. Pollner's research on folie à famille [Pollner, McDonald-Wikler 1985] demonstrated that epistemic practices, including 'reasoning, speaking, and acting through which members document and maintain their particular world' [Pollner, McDonald-Wikler 1985: 1] are guided by principles of mundane cognition even in cases of mental disorder. Regarding confabulations, it can also be suggested that some confabulatory utterances are organized according to the same principles, as illustrated by the examples analyzed in the first section. This can, at the very least, be relevant for 'mundane' confabulations [Robins 2017: 3] which do not involve fantastic details and are organized as mundane reports.

Thus, epistemic gain connected with maintaining consistency as a principle of mundane reasoning might potentially be applicable to some confabulations. It is important to take into account that many confabulations do not contribute to maintaining consistency, quite the contrary; consequently, they cannot yield the benefits discussed in this paper.

Let us now turn to particular epistemic benefits connected with the maintenance of consistency. First, let us consider its foundational role in

the context of confabulation. In the first section, confabulation concerning fairy-tales and legends was discussed. In the mentioned cases, the principle of consistency functioned as a rule of testing different versions of stories. Versions which made narrations more coherent, such as 'the wolf ate food from LRRH's basket', or 'the Indian was mortally wounded' were accepted, whereas the others were not. For instance, the reproduction of *The War of the Ghosts* which contained a contradiction was promptly replaced by another version. In these examples, fallacious versions were erroneously accepted by subjects based on the principle of consistency. However, these confabulations might still be regarded as epistemically beneficial. As indicated previously, principles of mundane cognition are sustained through their use for testing experiences and reports. This is applicable to these cases as well, because subjects followed a general principle of mundane cognition, despite being unsure about the content of the stories which they were retelling. Thus, certain confabulations help sustain one of the key principles which grounds our epistemic practices.

The benefit connected with a contribution to the sense of ontological security is also applicable to confabulation. A position of ontological security is achieved when a person 'has a sense of his integral selfhood and personal identity, of the permanency of things, of the reliability of natural processes, of the substantiality of natural processes, of the substantiality of others' [Laing 1965/1960: 39]. Some confabulations support the achievement of this position. For instance, this is relevant for beliefs which allow individuals to sustain a sense of personal identity. Equally important are confabulations which make narration more coherent. They presuppose the permanency of things and processes; therefore, they also contribute to the sense of ontological security.

Questioning principles of mundane cognition is very costly; as it was concluded in the precious section, maintaining mundane reason delivers very fundamental and substantial benefits. This is why confabulations which maintain consistency between various beliefs, in one way or another, are epistemically significant.

195

References

Albert H. (2016/1968) *Treatise on Critical Reason*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.

Bartlett F. C. (1920) Some Experiments on the Reproduction of Folk-Stories. *Folklore*, 31 (1): 30-47.

Bernecker S. (2017) A Causal Theory of Mnemonic Confabulation. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 8:1207. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01207.

Berrios G. E. (2000) Confabulations. In: Berrios G E, Hodges J (eds) *Memory disorders in psychiatric practice*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bortolotti L. (2015) The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 33: 490–499.

Bortolotti L., Cox, R. (2009) Faultless ignorance: Strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 18: 952–965.

Coliva A. (2015) *Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology*. Palgrave Macmillan in the UK, Houndmills, Basingstoke.

Coltheart M. (2017) Confabulation and conversation. *Cortex*, 87: 62-68.

Delbecq-Derouesne J., Beauvois M. F., Shallice T. (1990) Preserved recall versus impaired recognition: a case study. *Brain*, 113: 1045-1074.

Giddens A. (1991) *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford University Press, Redwood City, California.

Glowinsky R., Payman V., Frencham K. (2008) Confabulation: a spontaneous and fantastic review. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry*, 42: 932-940.

Hirstein W. (2005) *Brain fiction: Self-deception and the riddle of confabulation*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Kopelman M. D. (2010) Varieties of confabulation and delusion. *Cognitive Neuropsychiatry*, 15: 14-37.

Laing R. D. (1965 / 1960) *The Divided Self: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness*. Penguin Books, London.

Malcolm N. (1977) The Groundlessness of Belief. In: Malcolm N. (ed) *Thought and Knowledge*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.

McGinn C. (1984) *Wittgenstein on Meaning: An Interpretation and Evaluation*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

McKay R., Dennett D. (2009) The evolution of misbelief. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 32 (6): 493–561.

Merleau-Ponty M. (1968) *The Visible and the Invisible*. Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois.

Michaelian K. (2011) The epistemology of forgetting. *Erkenntnis*. 74: 399-424.

Moscovitch M. (1995) Confabulation. In: Schacter D. L. (ed) *Memory distortion: How minds, brains and societies reconstruct the past*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Örulv L., Hydén L. C. (2006) Confabulation: sense-making, self-making and world-making in dementia. *Discourse Studies*, 8 (5): 647-673.

Pollner M. (1975) 'The very coinage of your brain': the anatomy of reality disjunctures. *Philosophy of Social Sciences*, 5: 411-430.

Pollner M. (1987) *Mundane reason: Reality in everyday and sociological discourse*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Pollner M., McDonald-Wikler L. (1985) The Social Construction of Unreality: A Case Study of a Family's Attribution of Competence to a Severely Retarded Child. *Family Process*, 24: 241-254.

Robins S. K. (2017) Confabulation and constructive memory. *Synthese*. doi: 10.1007/s11229-017-1315-1.

Sacks H. (1972) Notes on Police Assessment of Moral Character. In: Sudnow D (ed) *Studies in social interaction*. Free Press New York.

Shyu M. (2002) The Essential Conditions for Reflective Learning Based on "Ontological Security". *Bulletin of Adult and Continuing Education*: 185-206.

Solms M. (2000) A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Confabulation. *Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and the Neurosciences*, 2 (2): 133-138.

Stolzenberg S., Pezdek K. (2013) Interviewing child witnesses: The effect of forced confabulation on event memory. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology*, 114: 77–88.

Sullivan-Bissett E. (2015) Implicit bias, confabulation, and epistemic innocence. *Consciousness and Cognition*, 33: 548-560.

Weinberg D. (2012) The Social Construction of Self Knowledge: A Commentary on the Legacy of Melvin Pollner. *The American Sociologist*, 43 (1): 76-84.

Wittgenstein L. (1972/1962) *On certainty*. New York: Harper & Row.

Рекомендация для цитирования:

Bardina S. M. (2021) The Epistemic Significance of Maintaining Consistency in Confabulation. *Социология власти*, 33 (4): 184-197.

197

For citations:

Bardina S. M. (2021) The Epistemic Significance of Maintaining Consistency in Confabulation. *Sociology of Power*, 33 (4): 184-197.