Timofey S. Demin

SPbU, St. Petersburg, Russia

In the article, the author examines the theory of knowledge of Bruno Latour from the perspective of analytic epistemology. Representatives of this approach—as well as Bruno Latour himself— are trying to answer the question: “What is knowledge?”. The author explicates the difference between Latour’s theory and the basic premises of the analytic epistemologists. In order to do this, the author highlights the theoretical foundations of Latour’s theory of knowledge and demonstrates the conventions in the analysis of knowledge which this approach violates. Using the distinctions of analytic epistemology, the author classifies Latour’s theory as a purist antisceptic invariantistic externalism. Such a theoretical position is one of the most common views on knowledge in this field. This classification of Latour’s views makes it possible to identify the problems specific to this position. The author demonstrates that Latour’s theory avoids some of these problems, that some of the problems have a solution specific to this theory, and that some of the problems are not specifically addressed within it. The advantage of Latour’s theory is that it copes well with the two main challenges of analytic theories of knowledge: the Gettier problem and the problem of skepticism. In the conclusion, the author offers a critique specific to Latour’s theory and presents possible objections to it.
Keywords: epistemology, knowledge, the analysis of knowledge, modes of existence, Bruno Latour